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however the younger generation of Senegalese were
beginning to question the moral right of assimilation. These
critics were the educated élite, by-products of an educational
policy of which Governor-General Chaudié had written
in 1897: 'The school is the surest means of action by which
a civilising nation can transmit its ideas to people who are
still primitive and by which it can raise them gradually
to its own standards. In a word the school is the supreme
element of progress. It is also the most effective tool of
propaganda for the French language that the Government
can use.'

Ousmane Socé Diop, in *Karim*, a remarkable study of the sort of young Senegalese most affected by French assimilation, published in 1935, shows not only how effective this policy was in those early days, but also points to the awakening of the Senegalese to the values of their own traditional society.

On certain evenings in Dakar, Karim and his young friends would talk not only of love but of their political and social ideas:

> The teacher was there, reasonable, but capable at moments of behaving foolishly, such as over the beautiful eyes of a Senegalese girl. He was a 'progressive', a partisan of a plan of evolution with its basis in the fundamental characteristics of his people.
>
> The graduate, a know-all, spoke of 'cleaning-up Senegalese traditions and of bringing about an immediate and thorough Europeanisation.
>
> The doctor, a Catholic, adopted Western civilisation without question. Nevertheless, his atavistic temperament remained one with that of his own people.
>
> Abdou was born a Muslim and an oriental and had been educated at a French school. His mind had been nurtured on European ideas and logic. His heart had been formed within the curious framework of the *Khalam*, of French poetry and European music. He was a person of contrasts. He could dance to the tam-tam as well as do the tango, he liked Negro music and black girls, but also dreamed of Deauville, of Paris and of some film-starlet, a blonde blue-eyed Venus.

Later Karim is sent out to a small town in the 'bush' where he has to help with the collection of the ground-nut

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crop. Struck by the simple, uncomplicated ways of the bush compared with that of Dakar, Rufisque and St. Louis he reflects: 'The teacher and above all the graduate who spoke so often of immediate and complete Europeanisation, should be here to see for themselves.'

Ousmane Socé Diop has pin-pointed perfectly the growing conflict in the minds of the educated Senegalese at this time and the ever increasing gap between the peoples of the *Quatre Communes* and the *sujets* of the bush.

Furthermore the Senegalese student in Paris was beginning to question the rights of colonialism in general and the honesty of France's assimilationist policy in particular. He was hardly encouraged by the pronouncements of a leading politician during the twenties and thirties like Albert Sarraut who wrote in *La mise en valeur de nos colonies* that the colonies had a threefold purpose of serving France. First the numbers of France's overseas peoples increased her population from 40 million to 100 million, thus giving her a greater manpower than Germany. Secondly they could make a financial contribution to France. Thirdly they could supply her with the raw materials she needed. France's civilising mission, whilst important, was conceived of by Sarraut as a by-product of these functions. (Quoted in L. P. Mair, *Native Policies in Africa.*)

As we have seen, assimilationist professions were rarely matched by the facts. And indeed in other parts of French West Africa education was limited. But in Senegal France made a major effort in education, so that by 1940 there had already been formed a substantial African élite, particularly in comparison to the country's population.

By 1938 18,000 boys and 1,500 girls, taught by 132 European and 337 African teachers were at school; even so, a very low percentage of the population of school age actually attended school. Nevertheless this was considerably higher than that of any other French African territory. Children were educated according to French methods with few concessions made to local factors. The aim was not

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only to civilise them but to make them aware of 'France's achievements' in Africa. Thus, as Lucy Mair has pointed out, history was taught so as to justify French occupation of West Africa. Several important *lycées* and secondary schools were founded. The *Lycée Faidherbe* and the *Lycée Van Vollenhoven* were to provide the basis of the modern élite whilst the *Ecole Normale William Ponty* educated many of the present leaders of French-speaking Africa. It was this new generation of educated young men, produced in the late twenties and thirties, that was first to question the virtues of an assimilationist policy both on the political and moral plane.

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Those who have not come under the influence of a strong assimilation policy have never had to assert their essential *négritude*. Thus the English-speaking African, whose culture and traditional political organisation was largely left intact by the British administration, was rarely concerned about his identity as an African and until very recently this problem has been of little concern for the Nigerian or Ghanaian. It has never occurred to him to doubt his *négritude*. There are of course a number of examples of what may be called assertion of the African personality in the English-speaking territories, but the cult of *négritude* never caught on in them as it did in Senegal and the other French territories.

Thus it was that the very Africans who had achieved the greatest distinction within the French cultural framework were to be the first to champion a return to the African past in search of their own essential personality. Thus it was that for long Paris became the cultural capital of Africa, for there the books and magazines were published in which they could tell the public of their new ideas. Whilst in the late forties and early fifties the British West African *évolué* was more concerned with the achievement of political independence from Britain, the French African *évolué* was more concerned with his cultural emancipation. Senghor's formation of a new political party is more interesting for the emphasis it lays on its reassertion of African values than for any proposed political rupture with France.

The reaction against assimilation, as P. Mercier has pointed out in *Elites Sénégalaises*, came essentially from the new educated generation.

> It is the elite that has given expression to this desire for a return to the fountain head . . . From an acceptance of assimilation characteristic of the preceding generation opinion turned first to less sharply defined positions—typified by the slogan 'assimilate, don't be assimilated'—and then the attitudes of refusal, the details of which are still not very clear. Such attitudes accompany a lush ideological growth, to which only a very brief reference can be

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668 personality, its uniqueness as Senghor saw it, is best understood from this quotation:

> That is to say that the Negro, traditionally, is not devoid of reason, as people would have me say. But his reason is not discursive, it is synthetic; it is not antagonistic but sympathetic. It has a different mode of perception. Negro reasoning does not detract from the things it contemplates, it does not mould them into two rigid schemes, thereby ignoring their very essence; it flows through the veins of things to arrive at the living heart of reality. The reasoning of the white man is analytical by utilisation, that of the Negro intuitive by participation.

Whether all the advocates of the African personality held so abstruse and philosophical a concept of its character is doubtful. But as the young poet Lamine Diakhite, a close disciple of Senghor, has written: 'Let us admit it, it is thanks to Senghor and Césaire that my generation became aware of itself, that it embarked upon the path of asserting its personality.'

[571] This movement, started in the late forties, was to touch mainly the intellectuals, those who had been most assimilated by the French. The poorer classes had of course not been so effectively alienated from their past. These intellectuals were during the next years to question everything in the light of this newly discovered or rediscovered African personality. Some advocated the shutting of the door against Europe and some of Cheikh Anta Diop's writings have elements of counter-racism. Whilst Europeans have been asserting their superiority over Africans for so long, he counters by asserting the Negro superiority over Europeans. Fortunately this negative attitude did not survive to any important degree.

There was also a healthy questioning of the values of European or Western culture, though this often went to the extremes of outright rejection. David Diop, the young Senegalese poet who died recently in an air crash, accuses [539] the white man's civilisation of hypocrisy:

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In the country where the houses touch the sky
but where the heart is not touched
In the country where the hand is placed on the Bible
but where the Bible remains closed.*

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The forum for this great re-examination of the African past was to be *Présence Africaine*, a bi-monthly review of Negro African culture, founded by a Senegalese called Alioune Diop in 1947 and open 'to all contributors of good-will (white, yellow or black), who might be able to help define African originality and to hasten its introduction into the modern world'. Although the review was Pan-Negro in outlook, its original inspiration came from a small group of Senegalese intellectuals in association with West Indians like Césaire and Haitians like Price-Mars. There was of course nothing parochial about this. It was only that the Senegalese were the first, for the reasons outlined above, to feel really strongly about the reassertion of African culture. And when in 1956 *Présence Africaine's* efforts culminated in the first Congress of Negro Writers and Artists, the Senegalese were to play a dominant role. In his opening speech to the conference Alioune Diop, the secretary and backbone of the organisation, made a moving protest against the myth of a people without culture, a protest that earned the support of all delegates. But his attacks on assimilation can have had relatively little meaning for delegates from the English-speaking territories; whilst some of the American Negro delegates like Richard Wright felt that as far as they were concerned it was impossible to return to a past from which they had been physically and culturally removed for over three centuries. Replying to a brilliant discourse by Senghor on 'The Laws of the Negro African Culture', he asked: 'I wonder where do I, an American Negro, conditioned by the harsh industrial, abstract force of the Western world that has used stern, political prejudices

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* Translated by Ulli Beier.

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against the society (which he has so brilliantly elucidated)—where do I stand in relation to that culture?'

Alioune Diop declared:

> Assimilation corresponds to a type of human relationship imposed by colonisation. It demands that the individual (for it affects only individuals) tear himself from his natural context and he who cannot assert his own personality must replace his habits of thinking, feeling and acting by others which he would only share with a foreign community.

By the time of this congress the Senegalese, as well as other Africans, had examined pretty thoroughly the whole question of French assimilation. For instance, A. Wade, a Senegalese, in a paper entitled 'Must Africa evolve a positive law?', protested against the use in his country of a foreign legal system evolved in a different social context and which could not meet all the requirements of traditional society. He called for a new legal system which would be in effect a synthesis of African customary law and French law. In another article he called for a reform of teaching methods in Africa in the light of local conditions. There were few stones this anti-assimilationist élite left unturned in their efforts to re-establish the values of the African past. They presented a dramatic contrast with the élite of the pre-war generation who, like the young men in Ousmane Socé Diop's *Karim*, so readily accepted the virtues of Western ways.

Amongst this group were a number who fell back not on the values of the African past so much as Marxist theories in their attacks on colonialism and assimilationist policy. Principal amongst this group was Majhemout Diop, leader of the pro-Communist *Parti Africain de l'Indépendence*. In issue No. 14 of *Présence Africaine* he attacked colonialism bitterly:

> There is no possible ambiguity; colonisation equals capitalistic enterprise. Any other explanation is invalid, is deceitful, a myth, a myth of civilisation and of co-operation.
>
> A coloniser cannot be humanitarian . . . that would be the

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flats and villas are usually beyond the range of the African purse though the difference is being eliminated by the accession of Senegalese, immediately prior to and in particular since independence, to high administrative posts and today there is no real residential separation. Many Europeans live in housing estates built primarily for Africans and not a few live in the Medina or main African quarter. Some trade unions are divided on racial lines between Africans and Europeans, largely because the European workers are skilled technicians and there are even to this day few Africans trained in most of the industrial work done by Europeans.

Nevertheless there are certain cases of bitterness between Africans and Europeans over the question of equal pay for equal work. Though the basic principle is that both groups should be paid the same rate for the same kind of work, the European in many cases gets an expatriation addition of up to two-fifths of his basic salary. This is not true of all classes of work. For instance shop girls in Printania, a local version of Woolworth's, earn the same pay whether white or black though of course the European staff are recruited locally from wives and daughters of Frenchmen working in Dakar. It is surely a healthy sign that Europeans and Africans can work together on equal terms and that Europeans can occupy what in Europe would be considered very humble positions.

One does not detect amongst the French in Senegal any very strong feeling for or against the African. Where any form of racism does manifest itself it is mainly at the level of the artisan worker or the *petit blanc*, a term generally used to describe the poorer white community of small shopkeepers, clerks, mechanics and skilled workers. When the Senegalese are confronted by outbursts of racism from members of this group they are usually inclined to return the abuse in kind, for the Senegalese are naturally an immensely proud people and have very little feeling of racial inferiority. Close contact with a French community

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563 formed as a result of the *loi cadre* reforms, are typical of the [645] Frenchmen who have identified themselves with the country of their sojourn. Indeed such was the devotion of Peytavin to his party's cause that he was retained as Minister of Finance even after independence and opted for Senegalese nationality, a step that Bonifay found himself unable to take. These were men of high education—Bonifay, a well known lawyer, and Peytavin a veterinary surgeon. There were many others like them, not only applying such principles in the political field, but in the administration and commerce, who helped to dispel from the African what would otherwise have been a dominant impression of an isolationist and sometimes racist French community.

[369] It would be foolish to paint too idealised a picture of race relations in Dakar. Many Europeans, particularly [571] the *petit blanc*, openly admit to holding the African in contempt. But these are usually Europeans of little economic or political consequence and since independence their opinions have obviously carried negligible weight with the Senegalese.

Furthermore most Europeans in Dakar and the other main towns of Senegal, whatever their prejudices, send their children to local schools, where perforce they mix on terms of equality with Africans. The same is true of [873] Dakar University which has a large number of French students, the majority of whom are girls whose parents are working in Dakar. Their brothers try if possible to go to French universities. Though friendships tend to be [572] within the same racial group, there is a considerable number of inter-racial friendships.

563 The main point of conflict would appear to the casual 369 visitor to be the economic domination of private enterprise 463 and the more important subaltern jobs by Europeans. 472 But before analysing any tensions that have arisen from this, it is essential to point to some special features of Senegalese society. In Senegal, by contrast with Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast, there is no entrepreneurial class of

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Africans. Indeed only very small scale trading is in the hands of Africans, otherwise large scale commercial enterprises are run by Europeans, and most of their managerial staff being European. Between these large scale organisations, the whole range of middleman trade is dominated by Lebanese and the so-called *petit blancs*. Small shopkeeping is predominantly in the hands of the Mauritanians, though larger shops particularly in Dakar, are run by Lebanese and Europeans. At first sight this would seem to be an unhealthy situation, and it would be foolish to ignore the inherent dangers in it. But the most ardent critics of this state of affairs are as often as not visiting Africans, not the Senegalese themselves. When a Nigerian shops in Printania or goes to the local bank in Dakar, he is shocked by the number of Frenchwomen employed in jobs he is accustomed to seeing held by Africans in Lagos. But in considering the rather special case of Dakar one must take into account a number of factors that are often overlooked by would-be critics.

Senegal is a territory of only 3,100,000 people and in the normal run of education in French-speaking African states, even taking into account Senegal's special position among them, the percentage of the population available to fill managerial and sub-managerial posts or indeed any 'European-style' job in all sectors of the economy, can hardly match up to the requirements of the most highly industrialised city in West Africa. In addition Dakar has a large international airport and a port that was the third largest in the French Union. It is also the centre of government for Senegal and the terminus of a railway. It is not surprising therefore that Senegal finds it more difficult to find the appropriate number of Africans to fill its senior posts in commerce and industry than Lagos which has a Nigerian population of over 36 million to draw on. Furthermore Lagos is in the centre of an area where missionaries have been active for over a hundred years and consequently

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463 [563] has enjoyed a much higher rate of education than was possible in an Islamic community like Senegal, even taking into account French assimilation policy.

There is a pronounced bias in Senegal against entering into commerce, whether at the African level or at the European level. This bias has been observed by many Europeans. It may be thought of as a mere attempt to explain away the lack of success or rather a lack of desire and intention to Africanise commerce, but against this view, M. Assane Seck, one of the leaders of the Opposition [665] *P.R.A.-Sénégal* and a lecturer at the university, who might normally be only too pleased to pin the slow rate of Africanisation of commerce on the Government, has said that one of the chief obstacles to the Africanisation of economy at its higher levels is the preference of the Senegalese élite, [571] and even the lesser educated classes, for work in the Administration. [647] Under the French the Administration seems to have enjoyed a very high status especially as rates of pay [465] have always been considerably higher than in commerce and industry. Commerce, even when it pays better, has among the Senegalese something of the smear it had in ninteenth-century England.

471 [472] Another barrier to the Africanisation of shopkeeping and small scale private enterprise is the difficulty the Senegalese have in amassing capital. The obligations towards members [596] of the extended family are such that a man with money has calls made on it from even his most distant relatives. This social parasitism is much stronger in Senegal than in most West African countries. One of the few important Senegalese business men operating in Dakar today has admitted that he had to reduce his family obligations drastically, not only because he was married to a European, but because unless he did so, he would never be able to keep enough capital in his business. Diop Abdoulaye, in his study of the Toucouleur, [736] has protested against the use of the term family parasitism for something which 'makes it possible to help those in need, the unemployed, for example, who can then

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EVOLUTION OF SENEGALESE ELITES

P. MERCIER

The increasingly rapid development of elites[1] of a non-traditional type is a conspicuous feature of the social change now occurring in all African territories. It is a sign of the most recent phase of the crisis through which colonized societies are passing. The problems connected with the crystallization[2] of such elites vary considerably in different regions and in different economic, political and social contexts. Even inside the group of territories composing French West Africa appreciable local variations can be observed. But everywhere these elites exert ever stronger and more united pressure on existing politico-social organizations in the hope of attaining to the leadership they feel to be their destiny. Wherever we study them, we find the same situation—fraught with conflict: conflict with the existing African social system imposed by colonization; conflict with the traditional ruling classes or what remains of them; internal conflict, when the elites do not—as yet, at any rate—form a homogeneous group, or, alternatively, when divergent trends appear. The same phenomena can be found everywhere, and go to make up a general pattern.

If, however, we wish to understand the discrepancies observed in the pace at which the new elites developed, their composition, their methods and capacity for self-expression, their ambitions, etc., we must study the differences between them. Among the criteria applicable in a first attempt to classify the various regional situations, the following appear to me to be the most important:

1. Extension of education. We have to take into account both a territory's crude school rate and, among other facts: any divergencies between the rates reached by different regions of the same territory; inequalities in the distribution of school facilities on racial, religious or other grounds, the distribution of the school population classified according to the various kinds and degrees of education, the distribution of the school population classified by sex, etc.
2. Types and degree of economic development, i.e. whether or not it has permitted the emergence of social categories well-integrated in modern economic life, and, in particular, with the capacity for investing money: rich farmers (mainly planters), merchants, entrepreneurs, etc.;[3] whether or not an embryonic working class has emerged in urban centres (an elite of manual workers more or less closely linked to the intellectual elite and anxious to assume leadership of a pseudo-proletariat[4] of casual labourers).[5]
3. Role of the traditional structures and social grades. The traditional political, religious and other systems have more or less succeeded in holding their own and the governing classes which made them work have been able to

1. The word 'elite' is used here in a very broad sense. It does not mean a ruling class, but a social category more or less enjoying prestige status and exerting influence, by its example, over the whole or large sections of the population.
2. Crystallization which does not necessarily result in the formation of well-knit groups.
3. The Ivory Coast offers the most typical example of such development.
4. In most cases, it maintains close ties with the district or the group from which it came.
5. The classic example is that of the Senegalese towns.

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preserve much of their prestige;[1] they are sometimes in diametrical opposition to the modernist elites and sometimes try to come to terms with them; occasionally, as the result of historical conditions, the two elites are closely interlocked.[2]

4. Types and degree of tension between the African modernist elites and the European groups. The latter occupy the position of ruling class in the whole community represented by each territorial unit. The conflict is fundamental, yet a balance, however temporary and precarious, between the two groups may sometimes be discerned, though it varies enormously in degree from one region to another and at different times.[3]

The situation in Senegal, compared with that in other parts of French West Africa, exhibits certain special features. Senegal was the first of these territories to be colonized.[4] At the beginning of the new phase which opened after the war, it had the largest number of educated and partly Westernized persons, and it has for several decades had a political life modelled on the West, though of a summary and limited character.[5] At this level of political life, the course of events during the past 10 years affords us a first glimpse of regional divergencies. It is a significant fact that Senegal was not the first French West African territory in which a movement making political demands of some magnitude arose. The acute crises of the immediate post-war period developed elsewhere—in the Ivory Coast—with the founding and expansion of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, the first political party in French Africa (Black) with nationalistic tendencies. The Rassemblement Démocratique Africain never succeeded in establishing itself firmly in Senegal, either before or after its change of policy in the 1950's.[6] There is no space here to describe in detail the historical and social background of such events, though I shall have to refer to it several times later in this paper. Some of the basic traits will suffice for mention: aspects of the traditional structures, of contemporary economic development, of the schools' endeavour to promote assimilation.

The principal racial groups inhabiting Senegal,[7] whatever their cultural differences, and whatever their traditional hostility to one another (which has still by no means completely disappeared) all had the same type of social and political organization. They were strictly graded societies divided into endogamous castes, each with its special economic, political, ritual and other functions. In the present context, inter-caste antagonisms and incompatibilities are as a rule more important than racial antagonisms, since several racial groups may have equivalent social gradings or one may have borrowed and adapted another's gradings. This is a fundamental feature; it indicates the framework within which we can explain the problem of relations between the traditional and the modernist elites. For instance, prestige due to education may be superimposed on prestige based on tradition, in particular prestige due to caste; or else the two may be completely separate.[8] Even today a high

1. Either officially or more or less 'clandestinely'.
2. E.g. in South Dahomey.
3. In the Ivory Coast, for example, a period of calm and co-operation followed when the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain dropped certain extreme claims.
4. Trade counters have existed for more than three centuries and the more specifically colonial period began more than a hundred years ago.
5. It had four municipalities with full privileges which sent a deputy to the French Parliament.
6. It broke off its alliance with the French Communist party.
7. The Ouolof, the Toucouleur and the Serers.
8. The resistance of the traditional ruling strata to foreign influence explains why, in certain cases, the lower castes were the first to go to school.

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standing in the modern context does not often completely redeem a traditional inferiority. The latter obviously does not prevent accession to such rank, but it does prevent a man from reaping the full benefit of the prestige which it confers. We shall have to revert to the ambiguity which thus characterizes individual situations, because it is an important aspect of the problem of the modernist elites. The old political organizations have either been destroyed or considerably weakened, though the prestige of the aristocratic families who hold the chefferies or are closely connected with them has not completely disappeared. But an important change has occurred: the power and influence of the traditional political chiefs has to a large extent been transferred to the khalifas of the great Islamic sects;[1] the latter represent today the principal force capable of resisting the modernist elite, and the one with which the latter and the political movements identified with it must to some extent come to terms.[2]

The changes due to the new economic conditions resulting from the colonial period can be discerned at several levels. The rural economy has been radically transformed—progressive abandonment of subsistence farming in favour of a single cash crop throughout a large part of the territory.[3] In contrast with regions where a plantation economy has developed, the average farmer's income has remained extremely low. Consequently, what has elsewhere been termed a 'rural bourgeoisie' has not emerged, and the most favoured economic categories coincide, by and large, with the upper strata of the traditional or semi-traditional type (heads of sects),[4] or with those artificially created on the same model by the colonial administration. Again, the group to which the name 'commercial bourgeoisie' has been given is still too small to have much influence;[5] almost all African traders are small shopkeepers and make no appreciable impact on the affairs of the community as a whole. The most significant changes are found at another level: urbanization and industrialization. Senegal is the most highly urbanized territory of French West Africa; about a quarter of the population live in the big towns and the administrative and trading centres. A very large wage-earning class with a steadily growing nucleus of stable labour has developed.[6] A workers' elite has appeared, and intensive trade union activity in the big towns has brought this class into touch with the educated elite (the administrative bourgeoisie, etc.).

This educated elite deserves special attention; in Senegal more than elsewhere, it represents the dominant element among the modernist elites. The educational policy was definitely conceived and organized at the beginning of the colonial period in the context of a policy and a ideology of assimilation. The educational curriculum introduced in the French establishments in Senegal at the beginning of the nineteenth century was essentially foreign to the tradition and culture of the autochthonous societies. Thus, in a recent paper, the author made much of the point that 'it was not a factor making for integration of the individual in his group, but rather—at any rate in the first historical phase—one making for a break. The adaptation of the curriculum and even of teaching methods

1. Their functions are hereditary.
2. Cf. below, remarks on the political parties of the traditional type.
3. In this case, groundnuts.
4. The economic role of the Mouride brotherhood is particularly important: colonization of new lands, experiments in mechanization, etc.
5. The middle-man trade is practically monopolized by the Lebanese colony; in the town of Dakar alone there are more than 5,000 Lebanese.
6. The region of Dakar alone has more than 50,000 wage earners in the private sector.

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to the African social environment was scarcely taken into consideration. The fact that the African languages were, and still are, totally excluded, even in the lowest school classes, brings out this tendency quite clearly, whatever the justification that may have been offered on practical grounds. The original policy has of course been relaxed in certain points; the principle of adjusting the French educational system to local conditions has been accepted—the adaptations being concerned however more with the physical than with the social and human framework. But the basic tendency remains.'

However, the schools could reach—and still reach—only a fraction of the population. And so the training of an 'elite' came soon to be regarded as a necessary first stage in the process of assimilation. The two ideas emerge closely intertwined in Faidherbe's famous declaration of 1860: 'Everyone can reach the same goal when he satisfies the conditions required of all of you alike, conditions which we are today putting within your reach. You see young men from the Christian families of Saint-Louis, who after a good start in the mission schools, go and continue their studies in a secondary school in France, come back fit for filling the highest positions in the colony. That road is open to you all alike. We are ready to facilitate access to the liberal professions for every child who shows exceptional talent at school. . . .' As a matter of fact, those, as yet few in number, who at the start of the colonial period received instruction on Western lines were supposed to be the answer to immediate, limited needs. The main object was to train interpreters, lower grade civil servants, clerks, etc., as the indispensable auxiliaries in the establishment of a colonial administrative and commercial system. Their role was a humble one, but they shared in the prestige of the European group and also, to some extent, in its privileged economic position. The notion of an elite rapidly acquired a wider and hazier signification; it came to cover all those who were thought to serve as a link between the colonizers, the bearers of civilization, and the untaught masses who were destined gradually to acquire it. In fact, the eager adoption of European values, and the acceptance of assimilationist policies characteristic of the period up to the last war, accentuated the trend towards a rift between the indigenous elite and the masses who still adhered to their traditional cultural and social systems.[1] A point deserving emphasis is the considerable attraction exerted by the centres of assimilation, notably the 'four communes',[2] the natives of which very soon received French citizenship, and in which education developed much more rapidly than elsewhere.[3] These events in the recent history of Senegal explain why prestige in modern times was focused on the 'intellectual' elite,[4] and why the latter made a considerable impact on that colony sooner than they did on the other French West African territories.

Intensive investigations have been made in the principal urban centres of Senegal[5] to ascertain the aspirations of the various population classes and the models they adopt. They cover adults as well as children. More summary samplings taken in rural surroundings show that there is less difference in this matter between the city and the country than might have been supposed.

1. Firm links subsisted, however, as will be seen later on.
2. Dakar, Gorée, Saint-Louis, Rufisque.
3. Multiplication of primary schools, introduction of secondary education, etc.
4. Taken in a very broad sense; for a long time, the mean type of this new intellectual elite was the *métis* (the holder of the primary school certificate).
5. By the sociology section of the Institut Français d'Afrique Noire.

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This is a significant fact; high prestige, more or less definitely acknowledged by the whole population, crystallizes around professions, functions or situations which are considered to be 'intellectual'—implying in fact a minimum of Western-type learning. Prestige on economic grounds seems to be definitely on the decline.[1] At Dakar, Thiès and Saint-Louis du Sénégal, adults were questioned about the trade or occupation they would like their children to take up. A vast majority of the socio-vocational categories (unskilled and skilled workers, traders, clerks, civil servants, etc.) from which the population sample under study was taken gave the same answer. Between 65 and 80 per cent mentioned an intellectual profession. Those most frequently cited were teaching (primary or secondary school teacher) and the liberal professions (lawyer, doctor, etc.); the technological professions (engineer etc.) were much more rarely specified.[2] One of the commonest answers was that vague but highly significant term, 'civil servant'. The fact is that the trend of education in the period before 1945 helped to establish a very close link between education and a job in the administration; this is still the case, despite the changes effected in the last few years. Similar attitudes are found in the results of surveys among children in the primary schools at Dakar. Among those who replied specifically[3]—about three-quarters of the children questioned—more than 80 per cent expressed a preference for an occupation considered to be intellectual, irrespective of their father's occupation; next came certain manual trades, with commerce far behind. The choice of an unspecified administrative job was less frequent than among the adults. It follows that the view generally taken about education—including primary education—viz. that it will lead almost inevitably to an intellectual occupation,[4] however modest, remains very stable; but it is less and less in keeping with the realities of the situation.

A brief study of the facts in the development of the educational system will allow us to make a first evaluation of the system. The crude school rate rose rapidly from 1946 to 1953 and has since continued to rise pretty regularly (16 per cent in 1953, 18 per cent in 1954, about 20 per cent in 1955). Senegal's early advance in this respect explains why the increase is less steep there than in most of the other French West African territories.[5] True, the school rate is still relatively low (and a fairly large proportion of the children do not complete even the primary course and will probably soon lose such learning as they have acquired), but a plateau was reached several years ago: primary education turns out many more pupils than the 'administrative bourgeoisie'—characteristic of the colonial period—or its equivalent in private enterprise can absorb. Formerly, the surplus of the educated population could be absorbed by the manual trades or by migration to other territories. But this second door is gradually closing now that these other territories are catching up in education. Moreover, the slow pace of economic expansion precludes any big increase in the number of openings for technical workers or in the supervisory grades in industry.[6] This is the justification for the talk about the educational over-

1. Material security (e.g. that enjoyed by civil servants) seems to be desired more often than actual wealth.
2. They are only beginning to acquire some prestige; the number of students choosing this branch has risen considerably in recent years.
3. Children from 10 to 14, in the 'intermediate' classes.
4. A job in the bureaucracy was for years the standard aim.
5. The school rate in the Ivory Coast almost trebled between 1946 and 1955.
6. Limited, but chronic unemployment, already exists in Dakar.

6: Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

equipment of Senegal in relation to the existing employment market. These facts must, however, be considered from another angle. The real problems are those of the true integration of education into a developing social environment, its adaptation to various local situations, and the adjustments which must be made in the Senegalese people's conception of education. These problems look, of course, more acute in the big towns, particularly in the former 'centres of assimilation',[1] which have often reached a relatively high school rate (sometimes more than 50 per cent); in many rural districts the critical phase is still a long way off. Recent changes in the position are marked by another important feature to which I shall revert at greater length: the difference in the distribution of the school population classified according to the various kinds of education. The past 10 years have been marked by the development of secondary and technical education, and the introduction of local higher education. At the beginning of 1955, pupils and students were distributed approximately as follows among the different types of education: 87 per cent in primary schools, 9 per cent in secondary schools, 2 per cent in vocational training schools, 2 per cent in higher education and its various equivalents.[2] At the same time education in French West Africa ceased to be an almost isolated system providing degrees and diplomas which were not recognized in metropolitan France and qualified their holders only for subordinate positions in most occupations.[3] The intellectual elite is becoming steadily more diversified. Its ideals are being noticeably modified; some of its prestige values are being revised; the masses are beginning to change their idea of what they mean by the elite. This is a transitional stage, with its own special tensions.

At this stage in the development of education—the outstanding fact in which is that, particularly in the urban primary schools, the demand exceeds the supply[4]—the signs are already fairly evident of a trend towards less mobility in the social scale. The prospects of reaching the ranks conferring most prestige differ in the towns and the rural zones, for the reasons already indicated. They are also tending to be less evenly distributed among the various sections of the urban population as the latter becomes more diversified. It is not, however, a case of the urban population breaking up into closed or nearly closed groups; none of the discernible social categories are of this character, nor can they be in any way likened to social classes.[5] In particular, relations based on kinship in the widest sense of the term continue to play a fundamental role, and maintain in being close ties among all the individuals composing the family group. Severance of these relations occurs only in extreme cases. Nevertheless, a trend towards the crystallization of social categories does appear, through the mere accumulation of circumstances.[6] The problem has been studied in a recent work the principal points of which I will venture to recall.[7] A survey of the urban district of Dakar—confirmed by later research in other cities—showed certain significant differences in the social origins of

1. The 'four communes' mentioned above.
2. Including young people studying in France.
3. Even in teaching, medicine, etc.
4. In Dakar it became necessary to establish part-time classes to meet an ever-rapid increase in demand.
5. Cf. P. Mercier, 'Aspects de la Stratification Sociale dans l'Ouest Africain' (Aspects of social stratification in West Africa), *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, XVII, 1954.
6. Studied, e.g. by G. Balandier, in *Sociologie des Brazzavilles Noires* (Sociology of the coloured population of Brazzaville), Paris, 1955.
7. Cf. P. Mercier, op. cit.

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

the individuals questioned; and these differences are likely to become sharper—45 per cent were farmers' sons, but considerable variations appeared according to the socio-vocational category. The proportion of unskilled workers was 80 per cent; it was only 42 per cent for skilled workers and craftsmen; still lower (33 per cent) for civil servants and subordinate office employees (the widest category of the 'administrative bourgeoisie' characteristic of the colonial period), 28 per cent for senior clerks and civil servants;[1] for members of the liberal professions in the widest sense[2] it was no more than 21 per cent. These last three categories taken as a whole represent the 'intellectual professions', according to the meaning still ascribed by the great majority of Senegalese to that phrase. Of those who had a father already in one of these professions, three-quarters were engaged in the same work. The same process of stabilization can, however, be observed, though less clearly, among specialized workers; of those whose father was a worker, nearly two-thirds still belonged to the same class; most of the others had been absorbed into the 'administrative bourgeoisie'. These, moreover, are the two chief categories,[3] from which there has emerged a new type of elite which really began to grow in size only after the last war.

Important changes in outlook, not only in Senegal, but in the whole of French West Africa, have accompanied this most recent historical phase. From the elite of the strictly colonial type as defined above there has begun to emerge—and even to take on separate existence—a new intellectual elite, still a relatively small group.[4] This elite, which might be termed that of the liberal professions—this time in the strict sense of the phrase—having a distinctly higher level of education and more definite professional competence, is able to lay claim to a quantity of posts until now almost exclusively held by Europeans. The category was not completely non-existent during the pre-war period; it developed earlier in Senegal than in the other French West African territories as a result of Senegal's possession of an embryonic system of secondary education.[5] Being numerically weak, this elite had an opportunity of associating, to a certain extent, with the European population, a fact which manifestly lessened its prospects of playing an active role and assuming the leadership of the African masses. Furthermore, it continued to follow the policy of assimilation and was the only element in the 'colonial elite' which succeeded in achieving it. It could find only a limited field of action in the political life of the 'four communes'. It consisted mainly of lawyers, a few members of the teaching profession and doctors and even a few administrators. It doubtless set an example for a colonial elite of a far inferior grade from which it was not entirely cut off; it showed them the road to be taken by the seeker after modern knowledge. Prestige of the kind hitherto enjoyed only by Europeans was transferred to them and was thus seen to be no longer out of reach and so engendered ideas of power—a share, even if limited, of political and administrative powers—and wealth, or material security, at the lowest. This role continued to develop after the war, though with a rather abrupt change of direction.

1. I.e. those holding posts of responsibility, regardless of their educational level.
2. Medical, teaching, medicine, etc.
3. The first, especially.
4. Only a few hundred individuals, including members of the 'colonial elite' who were belatedly given fresh opportunities for completing their studies and reaching a higher status.
5. *Lycées* at Saint-Louis, later at Dakar.

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The reason is not to be sought solely in the increase in numbers of this intellectual elite though that was quite substantial. Trained in Europe and remaining in touch with the world outside, it was the first section of the population to become consciously aware of the 'colonial situation',[1] and it immediately made an attempt to build up ideological systems which soon acquired crucial influence. Next, the changed pattern in the relations between Europeans and Africans speeded up the development of situations in which conflicts became inevitable, and encouraged the maintenance of close contact between the new and the colonial elites. I shall revert to this point later. True, tension existed, especially between generations, the older strata of the colonial elite having sometimes to defend the positions they had won.[2] But the younger people tended to identify themselves with the new elite, to accept its guidance and to share, more or less confusedly, in the same awakening to the colonial situation. Thus, the intellectual elite, in the broadest sense of the term, embarked in a new direction, and the political consequences of this change are now beginning to be seen. The problem of relations with the workers' elite which has emerged in the past few years is more complex; I shall come back to it in connexion with trade union activity.

In the typical pre-war situation, the African elite had little chance of competing with the European managing class, which was much less numerous that it is now.[3] It was trained to be what might be called an auxiliary elite. The new elite, on the contrary—notwithstanding the administrative and economic expansion of the past 10 years—will inevitably find itself in competition with Europeans in the managing and supervisory grades in an ever growing number of specific cases. Though still few in numbers, it has difficulty in finding a place in the territory's administrative and technological machine. It is a paradox that in a country immensely in need of responsible personnel, both managers and technicians, demand seems somewhat to exceed supply. In French West Africa, and particularly in Senegal, the government officially recognizes the existence of an 'employment problem for holders of diplomas'. One of the causes of this situation is no doubt the total absence of planning in the training of elites.[4] But the real explanation must be found in political circumstances and race relations.[5] The effort to 'Africanize' the upper grades encounters firm resistance, and so the rise of the elites is apparently seriously checked by the growing number of situations in which Africans and Europeans compete and which the two groups explain in diametrically opposite ways.[6] It is a significant fact that several Senegalese who have completed their studies in France have remained there, because they would be unable to find jobs for which they could apply at home. The problem is obviously even more acute in the private sector than in the administration.[7] Also, the European population has considerably increased in the past 10 years:[8] it has more than doubled in Senegal, tripled at Dakar—where it now represents about 10 per cent of the population.

1. Cf. the studies of G. Balandier, and in particular: *Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique Noire* (Present sociology of Negro Africa), Paris, 1955.
2. Especially in the administration.
3. Cf. P. Mercier, 'Le Groupement Européen de Dakar: Orientations d'une Enquête' (The European group at Dakar: Suggested line for a survey), *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, XIX, 1955.
4. An effort is now being made in this direction.
5. Cf. P. Mercier, 'Le Groupement Européen de Dakar', *op. cit.*
6. Patterns of thought based on the pre-war situation play a fundamental role here.
7. Where the trend, as yet timid, towards 'Africanization' of the upper grades can be discerned.
8. A general phenomenon in French West Africa which involves important changes in relations between Africans and Europeans.

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

cent of the population. Thus, the number of Europeans in intermediate or subordinate posts has substantially increased and the range of competitive situations, instead of growing less is being regularly extended. This affects not only the new elite, but a large segment of the old 'administrative bourgeoisie', and even, to some extent, the workers and lower supervisory grades in industry. And so, while—in theory—opportunities for reaching the highest ranks and simultaneously entering the European group (a consequence foreseen by assimilationist ideology) have increased with the development of education, in reality a radical change in the whole social structure has multiplied the causes of conflict. New factors have cropped up abruptly: further assimilation is gainsaid, Europeans and Africans become more and more sensitive to the realities of race, etc. Obviously, the political consequences of such conflicts are considerable.

I have mentioned cases in which a rift occurred between the elites and the masses, in the early years, at any rate, of the 'colonial elite'. This fact needs some further explanation, while the question of the relations between the 'educated' and the 'traditional' categories calls for re-examination on a wider basis. The stereotyped patterns maintained by the European administration underline the points of divergence. The administration has besides had a tendency—and not only in Senegal—to underestimate the influence of modernist elites and to depreciate their impact upon the population as a whole. True, important tensions can be observed, and some antagonism developed between the citizens (those of the 'four communes'), from whom the major part of the 'colonial élite' came, and the subjects in the other parts of the territory; but such tensions virtually disappeared with the legal changes introduced immediately after the war, a fact which is proof enough how superficial the points of divergence were. The 'educated' classes, moreover, sought to reap all possible profit from the power they acquired in their administrative functions, or in their role of intermediary between producers and the big commercial companies; and that attitude naturally set up a great many local conflicts. Sometimes they sought compensation for their inferior standing in the traditional framework by asserting themselves in the exercise of their new functions. As we have already shown, however, the population as a whole recognized the prestige of the new intellectual elite. True, their prestige did not necessarily displace the traditional prestige, but the two can coexist, a circumstance which stands out most clearly in rural districts. So, even if the 'educated' African has difficulty in fitting into the traditional system or even the family group, even if he is often a maladjusted element, he is rarely the fish out of water whom so many colonial observers considered him. All the elements of the population are still continually in touch.[1] There are two basic reasons for this. First, the range of family relationships is still a very wide one and they themselves are still effective; they maintain their hold on the 'educated' African even when he has left his birthplace. Secondly, religion—chiefly Islam in Senegal—and above all, membership of a sect, which is practically hereditary, continue to be important. The fact that tension between elites and masses led to nothing but quite limited and temporary breaks explains why the recent and entirely conscious effort to retie loose bonds was carried through with comparative ease. It was the new elite that, with political aims in view, inspired this effort. Usually too far removed from the

1. The vitality of racial or regional associations is significant in this respect.

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 M537 Senegal M537
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masses, it found in the 'colonial elite' the go-between it needed for the resumption of contact to which it aspired.

The activity of this new elite is beginning to be discernible in its political and trade union work, and its basic aspirations can be defined. As has already been said, a Western-type political life was introduced fairly early in one part of Senegal. Political parties were formed; after 1946, their influence extended throughout the territory. In a recent paper[1] we stated that they had become, in the 'four communes', an almost traditional part of the social system. Once they reached the whole of Senegal, they acquired an enormous body of followers, the divisions among whom reflected successively—or simultaneously, according to the district—a number of historical, social, ethnic and family rifts. Thus, the antagonism between the Socialist party and the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais, which has been a salient factor over recent years, did but reproduce according to time and place, the antagonism between former 'citizens' and former 'subjects', Ouolof and non-Ouolof, Moslems and Catholics, one Moslem sect and another, etc. On the whole, the 'colonial elite' has assumed the leadership of these parties.[2] But recent surveys have shown that, in the urban centres at any rate, membership in a political party might be commoner among the illiterate elements than among the 'educated'. This is a clear indication of the gap between the political parties and the present ambitions of the elites. A strongly held local position or the prestige of certain leaders is the reason why the traditional parties, though ill adapted to the present situation, have succeeded in keeping afloat. However, the waning influence of the Socialist party (the oldest organized party) was the sign after 1950 of the start of a new phase. The young elite from the liberal professions, followed by numerous young members of the 'colonial elite', remained markedly aloof from these movements, which seemed to efford no opportunity for the political action in which they intended to engage. Their sympathies went to a movement of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain type, although they were unable to impose it because of the strong positions held by the traditional parties. Yet some of the more influential members of this young elite finally decided to join the Senegalese party which seemed to have the strongest hold over the popular masses, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais.[3] There, they will doubtless play an important role. The point has been reached at which the new elite is seeking to take over the torch from the 'colonial elite', but with political ambitions of a much more radical nature; I shall consider later the ideological aspects of the problem. In the case of the trade unions, the position is slightly different. Their activity,[4] of recent origin, soon acquired deeper significance. The more energetic elements of the 'administrative bourgeoisie', in alliance with the still small working-class elite, embarked in the trade unions on a course of action which was more directly effective than that of the political parties.[5] The climate of thought, directly or indirectly influenced by theories of Marxist origin, favoured the growth of an awareness of the 'colonial situation'. In this respect, however, the new intellectual elite played

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1. Cf. P. Mercier, *An Experimental Investigation conducted by means of Questionnaires in the town of Dakar*, report presented to the Conference on the Social Impact of Industrialisation and Urban Problems, organized by Unesco at Abidjan, 1954.
2. As have, needless to say, certain members of an elite formed from the liberal professions, which had already emerged before the war.
3. In which they represent the 'left' wing.
4. Most of the unions are affiliated to the trade union federations in France.
5. And more resolutely moderate in its outlook.

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

only a limited, and very indirect, part. Between this group and the working-class elite certain persisting tensions can be descried; a survey among the younger members—students, young workers—has brought to light more or less radical divergencies. However, the new elite is trying to extend its activity to the trade union sphere. A confederation of African workers independent of the organizations in metropolitan France has recently been founded, in which the young intellectual elite will apparently be extremely influential. This would be the counterpart of its entry into organized political action. In another domain, significant changes are occurring: the 'cultural associations' have a much more important role than their name would imply.[1] These are made up of the intellectual elite (in the widest sense in which I have used this term), which seeks by these means to avoid being relegated to a position of isolation, to acquire greater influence in the education of the people—e.g. through theatrical representations in one of the local languages—and to rediscover the highways of traditional African culture.

It is the new elite that has given expression to this desire for a 'return to the fountain-head'. A reaction, against assimilationist policies has appeared. From the acceptance of assimilation characteristic of he preceding generation opinion turned first to less sharply defined positions—typified by the slogan 'assimilate, don't be assimilated'—and then to attitudes of refusal, the details of which are still not very clear. Such attitudes accompany a lush ideological growth, to which only a very brief reference can be given here. It is not exempt from inconsistency; it is intertwined with growths of very different origin, sometimes hostile to each other. The only point at which all these ideologies concur is that they one and all are the expression of an intense reaction against colonialism—and obviously against the policy of assimilation—and serve as a basis for a growing 'nationalism'.[2] I will mention only the following points: the revival of African cultures and the affirmation of the common elements in a pan-African or, more generally, a Negro culture; the development of a veritable mythology around the notion of 'Negrohood'[3] and of a sort of 'counter-racism', the end-result of which is to shut the door on the outside world—i.e. primarily the Western world; the reinterpretation of history through a reversal of the perspective, a method applied not only to the history of the slave trade and the colonial period, but to the whole history of Africa as well;[4] the forging from Marxist theories of an ideological battering ram, to be used in a specifically African anti-colonial drive. The results of all these efforts make rapid headway throughout the 'educated' classes.[5]

The above picture is unavoidably only an incomplete outline. I have merely sought to bring out the importance of the present transitional phase and its characteristic processes. A new intellectual elite is taking up the torch from the 'colonial elite' which in Senegal had already succeeded in gaining appreciably greater influence than in the other French West African territories; there has been no break between them. And yet tensions and possibilities of conflict exist. Nevertheless, the conscious search for points of contact w[illegible]

2. The study of political problems is a particularly important part of their activity.
2. In the African context, this term is used very broadly, to cover all anti-colonial movements.
3. The review *Présence Africaine* offers many examples of articles showing the influence of this idea.
4. The recent book by Cheikh Anta Diop, *Nations Nègres et Culture* (Negro nations and culture), Paris, 1955, is a highly significant example of what is being done on these lines.
5. There are still more trends, but they indicate a change of outlook which will probably become deeper with time.

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the masses which are still partly traditionalists helps to strengthen the ties between the masses and the elite—ties never completely broken. General acceptance of the example set by the elite testifies at another level to the permanence of those ties (despite frequent conflicts, misunderstanding, and failures at adaptation). However, certain traditional factors making for heterogeneity still enter into the picture. Tensions can most easily degenerate into conflicts when relations between members of different racial groups, or different castes, [578] are involved. That is a problem which cannot be studied in detail here. But the survival of such rifts (other examples in Negro Africa show that they may reappear after being temporarily suppressed) is a basic fact. A long time will probably be needed before the obstacle they represent to the growth of a homogeneous elite wielding universal influence can be overcome in Senegal. But only when that has been done can the broad general trends briefly described above find their complete expression.

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Metropolis. Until recently the African élite has always come from St. Louis. It is a sort of spiritual centre of Black Africa. It had the first school—Lycée Faidherbe. And in 1866 it was given the first Hotel de Ville of the French Union. It is the cradle of the French Union. It would be a tragedy if it died.'

To such men as these it seems scandalous that St. Louis with its great history and traditions should give way to a parvenue like Dakar. Of all West African cities St. Louis is the one with the most illustrious and fascinating history. It was called St. Louis after the great French King, Louis XIII, in the middle of the seventeenth century. However, in the following century it began to expand into a town whose inhabitants were a distinct race, comparable to the Creoles of Sierra Leone. White and black intermarried to form a group known as the St. Louisians. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries these were the great families of the Senegal, though today they are losing importance. Names like Carpot, Descanet, Deves, Guillabert and Crespin are still remembered with respect in St. Louis.

By the end of the eighteenth century the town had more than 7,000 inhabitants and in 1778 a mayor, who had to be chosen from the local population, was charged with the maintenance of good relations between the people and the Governor. In 1833 all inhabitants of St. Louis were given the status of French citizens.

Perhaps the most important date for St. Louis and for West Africa was 1854, when General Faidherbe was appointed Governor. Today his mark is still firmly on St. Louis. The ordered layout of the city and its streets were his work. The large bridge connecting the island on which St. Louis stands to the mainland is named after him. The city's most important and famous school is the Lycée Faidherbe. And even now one can listen to old folk sitting on the benches of the park, in which his statue stands, telling tales of the great General, who had fought against the famous Toucouleur chief, El Hadj Omar and brought Senegal, Soudan and Mauretania into the French orbit. Perhaps some of these old people are his own descendants, for he is reputed to have been a prolific father.

By 1878 St. Louis had grown to a city of 16,000 inhabitants, and despite the rapid expansion of Dakar and Rufisque farther down the coast, there was little to worry about the future.

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
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536 theatre. But the writing was powerful and distinguished. My most vivid memory of Ka at that time was an ear-shattering torrent of abuse directed at his leading lady: 'Pas de Fred Astaire ici. Çe n'est pas le Music Hall.'

Today that play is a thing of the past, which nevertheless brought him fame. Now he is engrossed in a piece about a young schoolteacher who is sent to a pagan animist village in the south of the Senegal, to found its first school. The play centres on the conflict between the educated teacher and the local witchdoctor who opposes the school. Deep in Ka's intellect is a striking preoccupation with the conflict of occidental reason with the seemingly irrational metaphysics of the forest and the bush.

Ka was seized by numerous other friends so we agreed to meet the following day at a café in the Avenue William Ponty, Dakar's main thoroughfare.

[547] The small café was crowded. Across the street the Café de Paris with its large, bad painting of Montmartre, was half empty and its clientele, sitting at the iron street tables, stared at us with vague interest. Ka was talking animatedly about nineteenth-century Russian novelists and the decline of Russian literature today. He was very typically '*rive gauche*' and indeed we might well have been in St. Germain des Prés.

'Of course, I think that Huxley is more essentially English than Graham Greene,' my companion continued in a new vein.

Later I went with Ka to his room in a small, dingy hotel in the back streets of Dakar. 'I prefer living here, away from my relations. At least one is free.' I wondered whether it wasn't because it reminded him of his life in Paris.

Together we read his latest play about Chaka, in which he treats the great Zulu as a narcissist. Once again I was struck by the power of his writing, the economy of his style. We fingered through copies of *Présence Africaine*, *Traits d'Union* and *Afrique* [204] *en Marche* where he and his fellow intellectuals have their works published.

668 Most striking of all is the cultural revolution, so marked in
571 Dakar, but gaining momentum from all parts of the French West African Federation. Ka Abdou Anta is a part of this revolution, which has produced a generation, albeit small, of intellectuals who can vie on equal terms with their counterparts in Europe.

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
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Their grounding in French culture is superb. It is evident in their writing and in the exacting logic of their minds which sometimes, as so often with the French, can lead them to points of profound illogicality. We have nothing comparable in British West Africa. The creative output of these French Africans, good or bad, literary or scientific, is immense, especially if one considers that the whole of French West Africa has a population just equal to that of Northern Nigeria. Some of their leaders, like Léopold Sédar Senghor, stand on intellectual pedestals in France at the foot of which even Jean Paul Sartre sometimes worships. The reasons for this aspect of the revolution are not altogether difficult to discover. The French have, as opposed to the British, always been assimilationists. 'La France entend conduire les peuples dont elle a la charge.' French culture was fed to these young men and their success today is a tribute to the success of the French 'civilizing mission'. The other important factor is that French intellectuals have on the whole been negrophiles, and African art and culture has long enjoyed a vogue in France.

Today French Africans have a striking confidence in their intellectual prowess that one rarely remarks in the British West African equivalent. They know French culture like Frenchmen, but, in the words of M. Alioune Diop, the editor of *Présence Africaine*, 'It is necessary that we black men affirm that we alone can interpret our own culture.' And this interpretation seems largely to involve a return to the past such as Cheick Anta Diop, a much respected Senegalese writer, has advocated. In a sense Ka is involved in this return, this new movement. For him and his fellows the burning question becomes: Will this new generation of intellects ever derive anything from such a return? Or indeed are they in any better position to grasp the essentials of their traditional culture than the French negrophiles who first made them aware of the values of their own art.

An African professor at the University of Dakar, Monsieur Alassane N'Daw, remarked in an article 'Un Africain devant la Culture Française' published in the journal *L'Education Africaine*, that when he held a discussion with his philosophy class on Malraux's views on Negro art there was 'no enthusiasm, nor even any particular interest, but rather general scepticism'. One of his pupils confessed that when he visited the museum at Abomey in

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
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668 Dahomey he experienced no aesthetic pleasure from Negro art, but was rather struck by its crudities. Indeed Professor N'Daw had difficulty in explaining to his students that European enthusiasm for African art was serious.

[571] Earlier in his article he points out the difficulty of the African intellectual who is torn between two cultures: the call of the past demanding fidelity to Africa, and the fascination of Western culture in which he has been educated and one of whose languages he uses to express himself. He is usually much more strongly drawn towards the latter.

In essentials these intellectuals are Frenchmen. They are living in a modern, occidentalized world far apart from the tribal, agricultural society that produced this art. Can they go back and at the same time go forward? Is there anything in the past that is appropriate to the new Africa they are trying to construct? This is their dilemma.

In Dakar the revolution is almost complete. What matters for these Africans are the years of reconstruction that lie ahead. Perhaps this vigorous young generation of intellectuals would do well to look to a better future than to a past from which they are almost totally divorced.

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
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The New Political Life

369 668 More importantly, the urban centers deserve attention because of the role they have played in the development of a radically new type of political life, one [177] whose forms have been largely borrowed from outside Africa. The first attempts at political organization and activity were born in the cities. More recently some political movements have appeared in a rural context, as a reflection of rural conditions, but they have drawn much of their pattern from the cities, or from among elements subject to urban influences.

The modern African city presents a set of conditions favorable to the development of especially intense political reac- 369 tions. The position of the colonizing power is most sharply apparent in the city, and the instruments of its power are concentrated there. The rootless condition of the African population seems at its extreme; the masses that gather in the city are unsettled, poorly established in their occupations, and suffer from • [571] every form of insecurity. The new elites created and shaped by urban life feel restricted and disappointed in their desires for social advancement and for a share in authority and in modern symbols of prestige.[5] Finally, the city brings to- [563] gether a white society and a Negro society, though often clearly separated by topography. In these circumstances racial tensions can develop to their maximum. Moreover, they assume varied aspects, *e.g.*, competitive situations in various spheres, official or unofficial discrimination.[6] Intense reactions to such conditions may take no organized form and may not manifest themselves except after some delay, however. Here the

[P. 5A]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
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369 668 portant part of the urban population has considerable mobility, and thus maintains solid ties and frequent communication with the regions of its origins.[8] Moreover, lesser members of the modern urban [571] elites, *e.g.*, workers and petty officials, have been settled in rural centers, thus extending urban influence still further. By these means a double network of individuals more or less shaped by the conditions of urban life is established. Contacts and relations between urban centers and rural districts can vary markedly, however. The area affected by the prestige of political leaders thus may be more or less extensive. The forms of activity and organization created in the city generally can be transplanted to rural sectors only in their rudimentary forms.

In Senegal, historical factors account for the sharp division between city and countryside. In the old coastal cities, a separatistic history and a particular juridical status have contributed to their marginal position in Senegalese life. The consequences of the separation between the former "citizens" of "the four communes" and the former "subjects" of the interior[9] have not been entirely wiped out, even in recent years.

From the foregoing points of view, Senegalese urban political life can be oriented in summary fashion to the general problems of urban political life. A series of particular traits in the Senegalese situation are first interpreted against the historical background. The subsequent section summarizes the results of investigations conducted in certain Senegalese [114] centers in 1953-1955, during a period of transition between two major phases in the development of political life.[10]

[P.6A]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
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668 signed to be distinctive, and to a degree
665 founded in opposition to these patterns, nevertheless conforms with them, at least for a time, within the "old cities." This is one of the limits of the political system of this period: the deepest political aspirations, which are rapidly gaining strength, can be only partially expressed within a partisan structure.

(2) The central role of certain non-political groupings and organizations[26] in the elaboration of more radical ideologies and in the formation of the most active groups. This must be viewed as a direct function of the preceding condition.

• [57] (3) The temporarily marginal status of an important part of the new elites, whose formation had accelerated in the post-war years. At the time of study, a shift of elites was occurring. Youthful elements were vigorously opposed to what was termed the "bourgeoisie of the old cities."[27] This is another indication that the underlying forces still laid outside urban politics; they did not enter them until 1956.

The New Parties

665 After 1946 a series of political parties
369 emerged: the Senegalese branch of the S.F.I.O., the B.D.S., the M.P.S., and the U.D.S.[28] Only the first two received wide support, yet one cannot fail to be impressed by the extent of party membership. Out of a group of 1,200 men interviewed at Dakar, for example, more than half (56 per cent) declared themselves members of a party.[29] The percentage was very high, and of considerable significance. The population involved in this sampling was essentially a stable one, or at least one settled in cities for several years. Other researches justify

[P. 10 B]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
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467 668 both in France and in other countries. Participation in international congresses put them in contact with the ideological currents of the world. A study of the union press was very revealing in this regard.

[665] To the masses, unions proposed goals that were, in the period under consideration, far different from those of the political parties. Unions were in many ways more systematic and more vigorous. They were much less apt to make [563] differentiations along ethnic, religious, or other lines. The unity of action that they practiced banned their assimilating such hostilities and conflicts, whose meaning was foreign to them. These hostilities yielded before the fundamental hostility brought out by union action. The near-unanimity with which the directives of the union have been followed is very significant. For the elites, on the other [571] hand, unions offered, in an era in which the forms and matrices of customary political expression appeared too narrow, a wider and more adequate field of action. Unionism supplied the most accessible agencies for sharing in power of the modern sort. The intellectual elites furnished [571] the substance of the union framework and played a dominant role on their executive committees.[52] Located at the very center of situations of tension and conflict, they found in union activities the most effective way of asserting modern views and of surmounting the limits barring their advancement in the political and occupational fields.

Developments Since 1956

668 369 Such were the chief aspects, in a period of transition, of the political life of the large Senegalese urban centers. In the subsequent four years, great changes have occurred. Senegalese political individuality — considerably modified by that of the "old cities" — has remained clear, but it has in great part shifted to

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8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[50] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Aspects des problemes de stratification sociale," *Cahiers intl. de Soc.* XVIII, 1954.
[51] A scrutiny of union publications in 1953 made this evident.
[52] In a very broad sense; their composition was very heterogeneous and drawn from various strata.

[P.187]

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8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
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other fields.

668 369 In the "old cities," changes have taken place that were already evident when the investigations noted above were being conducted. The importance of these facts must be emphasized:

(1) The separation between the cities and the countryside, and more particularly between the old cities and the rest of the territory, is becoming less sharp. This fact has already been pointed out in connection with recent demographic developments and the growth of the B.D.S. There are other indications. The 591 668 369 intellectual elites have more diversified origins; though the oldest nuclei of urban population remain important in their composition, they are steadily decreasing in size. The bonds among the different sections of the territory are tightening. On the other hand, the old elites are becoming active outside city boundaries, and give a place in their considerations to the problems of rural modernization and evolution. Certain projects established by the youth associations and the unions have contributed to this orientation.

(2) These facts are connected with a shift in generations that has extensive effects. The attitude of youthful elites has been different; they feel themselves competent to assume broader responsibilities.[53] At the same time they are diverging more or less impetuously from the paths of "assimilation," and are striving to rediscover and revive specifically African values. An effort to prove themselves individually by integrating themselves into the existing system is being succeeded by an effort to prove themselves as representatives and guides for a host that must be freed from this system. This is a trend toward nationalism, in the widest sense of the term.

668 369 563 (3) In the coastal cities, the growing strength of racial tensions since the last war cannot fail to encourage such a

[P. 19 A]

668 369 [563] change. The vast increase in the number of Europeans, their greater occupational diversification, the much stronger reaction to the facts of discrimination, and multiplication of competitive situations — occupational or otherwise — are the most obvious phases of this major phenomenon.[54]

As these factors have come into full operation, a new phase of political life has opened. These are its principal traits:

668 665 [467] (1) From 1956 on, in unions and in politics, secessions from the original French bodies — confederations or parties — have multiplied. Previous remarks indicated the development of this process among unions. After some delay it affected the S.F.I.O. itself, which was transformed, not without difficulties, into the African Socialist Movement. The assimilationist tradition declined, or at least was no longer proclaimed openly. After the parties became autonomous, the distinction between direct and indirect forms of political expression began to disappear. Extremist demands of a nationalistic character found expression within the parties, and worked effectively there after 1957 (at the time when the new "organic law" authorized the first Senegalese government).

(2) To a certain degree, the very old Senegalese political tradition once more became a driving force. At the same time the marginal elements, whose existence was particularly marked among in- [571] tellectuals, entered into real politics, chiefly within the framework of the B.D.S. They comprised the left wing of the new Senegalese Populist Bloc (B.P.S.), which stemmed from the B.D.S., and shared in the creation of the African Convention, which is striving to extend outside Senegal the strictly autonomous orientations of the B.D.S. They tried to organize the B.D.S. as a

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8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[53] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Evolution des élites sénégalaises," *Bull. intl. des Sci. soc.*, VIII (#4, '56).
[54] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Le groupement européen de Dakar," *Cahiers intl. de Soc.*, XIX, 1955.

[P.19C]

[563] [151] 899 269

/174 cont./

162 the development of agricultural work; there has been none
463 of this. Indeed, the lands are the property of the Lebou of
[427] neighboring villages and the cost of renting is high. Gardening therefore remains the privileged domain of the old villages of the peninsula, Keur-Massar, Thiaroye-sur-Mer, and Cambérène.

2nd. The great majority of the labor force is made up of non-specialized workers: almost 45% manual workers without occupational qualifications.

3rd. The Moors have a special place: two-thirds are merchants who keep shop, and the last third is made up almost exclusively of butchers who have been classed among the "manual workers."

4th. The most interesting feature is the difference which distinguishes the occupational structure of the districts from that of the quarters: in the first, no shop, either Moorish or Wolof, and practically no artisan; in the second, practically one worker out of two has no occupational qualifications, whereas this proportion drops to 12% in the districts; finally, and above all, out of three heads of families in the former, two are officials, whereas there is no more than one official out of ten in the latter.

362 The reason for this recruitment is solely of an economic
463 nature. Almost all the inhabitants of the districts are owners
[427] of their dwellings or will become such after they have made
[426] their payments. Now, these are spread over five years and have been calculated in such a way that the monthly payment does not exceed a quarter of the salary received. For
[465] the cheapest dwellings this is equal to a payment of 5,000, therefore to a monthly salary of about 20,000. A /175/ guard, houseboy, or a laborer does not earn this sum and is incapable of procuring a dwelling of this type. The dwellings of the districts are thus principally reserved for the officials, and then for the staffs, who have an adequate and
● 571 an assured salary. We therefore witness here the appearance of this phenomenon of social differentiation observable in many other African countries; it consists of the existence

/175 cont./

571 of a favored sector of the population with privileged living and working conditions, which is composed largely of officials, but which it is nevertheless difficult, in the present state of research, to characterize as bourgeoisie, or as a class. With what sort of social layer are we dealing? The study of the educational level and schooling will show us this.

464 The investigation does not bear specifically on unemployment; nevertheless, it is impossible to speak of Pikine without mentioning the importance of this problem. That unemployment is considerable may already be deduced from the fact that most of the workers do not have any occupational training which would permit them to find employment. Those who were between 18 and 65 years of age and who were without steady work at the time of the investigation have been regarded as unemployed. This category therefore includes not only those who were unemployed all the time, but also those who did "odd jobs," finding a little work to do here and there to help out a friend, a neighbor, or a relative.

In the first stratum we have listed 79 unemployed, and four in the second, which leads to a total of 1,580 unemployed out of an economically active male population of 5,530, or a rate of unemployment of 29.3%. For the family heads this rate is not quite as high: 26.3%. Here is how it is distributed according to ethnic groups, age classes, and the educational level. /Table 12 appears here./

/176/ Unemployment is naturally much less high among the literate, all of whom have some kind of occupational qualification, than among the illiterate. The former, moreover, are for the most part young people. The proportion of unemployed is at a minimum in the 30-year class. The case of those over 50 years old is more serious, since it is in general a matter of people whose age, lack of occupational qualifications, and often the late date of their immigration gravely jeopardize their chance of finding employment.

Let us note in conclusion that the rate of unemployment of the Toucouleur is the lowest, although their age at immigration is higher, and that their average competence does not exceed that of the other ethnic groups. This fact, as the investigations of the Toucouleur migration by the MISOES

/186 cont./
of each sect. /Table 23 appears here./

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Table 23

Confession	Tid.	Kh.	Mur.	Lay.	Without sect	Cath.	Av.
Literate	22	8.5	10.3	22.2	11.2	50	21.5
Illiterate	78	91.5	89.7	77.8	88.8	50	78.5
Total	100						100

The number of Moslems declared as without sect is too small to give any valid information. The small number of literates among the Khadres comes from the Moors, and their proportion doubles if one does not take the latter into consideration. Hence there remain only the Murids, among whom the proportion of literates does not come to half /187/ of the average percentage: 10.3 instead of 21.5. If one cannot say that Muridism specifically encourages illiteracy, neither can one say that it develops a taste and desire for learning among its adepts; the foregoing fact would tend rather to show that it plays the role of a curb, voluntary or involuntary, in the same measure that illiteracy constitutes a force of inertia to be conquered and that education, on the contrary, perpetuates itself. In any case, the intellectual elite of the Pikine population prefers to join the other sects.

[571]

VI. Habitat and Family

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After having presented the social framework of the whole society of Pikine, we shall conclude this quick study by showing first the material factors that condition its mode of existence, and then a certain number of general considerations concerning the structure of the urban family.

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369 a pharmacy has opened since the investigation took place,
[AAA] and the construction of a maternity hospital is in progress...
[1943] Some large sewer works are to be undertaken.

369 On the other hand, it is certain that the material dif-
571 ference between the two habitat groups, very distinct geographically, brings about and expresses an indisputable sociological difference. The population of the districts enjoys superior conditions of comfort, it is better acculturated to the urban environment, the educational level there is higher on the average, and, on the occupational level, one finds there a large proportion of officials and minor staffs of industry and commerce. All these factors therefore contribute to accentuating a certain separation between two social layers. But at the same time that integration into modern life and work and participation in the advantages and obligations of the urban environment alienate the inhabitants of the districts from traditional conditions, and by that even from their fellow-citizens who do not have the same advantages, a reverse movement of return to tradition or of reinforcement of former behaviors is discernible. There is thus not really a rupture: the family patterns, the relationships between man and woman, change less quickly than housing conditions, and this explains why the unity of the society has not been affected, at least not yet, by the recent change, and why the style of family life remains the same in the parcels of the quarters or in the enclosed concessions of the districts. A more detailed analysis of the conflicts of these contradictory forces belongs to another work.

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very small number of aspects of the social structure; allusions will be made to the others when it is necessary. 121

On the one hand, we shall illustrate certain aspects of the structure of kinship groups in the African population; despite the shrinking of the functions performed by the family in an urban environment, despite the diversification of groupings with specialized functions, which characterize urban social life, their role continues to be of primary importance (3). 121 571 369

3. The demographic account by L. Masse, of course, crosschecks certain aspects of this study. Cf. our preface /untranslated/.

Very /12/ close to it is the one played by the ethnic group, which will only be outlined here. On the other hand, we shall study the role played by certain non-structured de facto groupings: neighborhood units, groups of friends, more or less independent, depending on the case, of traditional, ethnic, and familial ties and structures. The study of structured groupings of a new type will be reserved for another work; we shall only give brief indications on this subject.

The profound interconnection of the social phenomena observable in a defined environment (1) must, however, as

1. Which itself is never closed. Cf., for example, the role of the waves of seasonal immigrants in colonial towns.

always, be emphasized. The first part of this account will therefore be devoted to a very general account of the frameworks into which one must recast any study of the Dakar social complex (2). 121 361

2. These have been, up to the

17: Mercier--15 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37
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/18 cont./

and Urbanization in Africa, Abidjan, 1954). 369x 565 [113]

tendentially have the character of social classes. They are distinguished by the living standard and way of life and by a certain number of specific behaviors, but the characteristics of colonial society, on the one hand, and, on the other, the persistence of traditional values do not permit them to assume the character of clear-cut classes." We shall return to this account, where we noted the absence of close correlations [182] between socio-occupational category, ethnic group, and religion, but, on the other hand, the existence of very clear correlations between the socio-occupational categories and facts such as level of French studies, the importance of intermarriages between different ethnic groups, that of the role played by the groupings and associations of a new type (political parties, syndicates, etc.). Also the ethnic affiliation plays a role of variable importance, although it is very rarely obliterated completely.

4. The new structures which characterize the towns 369x 571 give a large place to grouping of a political, syndical, cultural, sportive, etc. order. We shall not discuss this problem here. It must be noted, however, that in Dakar the importance of some of them is considerably reinforced by the function that Dakar performs as the federal capital; it is valid for the syndicates and to a lesser degree for the political parties.

5. Finally, an important fact in every colonial town, 369x 563 but particularly in Dakar is the juxtaposition of racially and culturally different groups. For Dakar, the European population undoubtedly represents 10% of the total population (2), and 162

2. In the census of the non-autochthonous population of 1951, close to 22,000.

17: Mercier--41 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37
Dakar

/34 cont./ 369x

2. And much less, as we have seen, with regard to the facts of "familial parasitism."

categories that on the whole have the same way of life. The distinction which has imposed itself between two groups of categories corresponds to this last fact. The boundary, however, is unequally clear, depending on the phenomena considered. One finds the problem of cultural persistences cutting across the changes of structure and way of life in the course of consolidation.

3. The at least partial entry into the western "technical milieu" appears to be a factor of transformation much less important than schooling. The majority of the specialized workers are still in the most traditionalist group, with only the master workmen approaching, in certain forms of their average behavior, an intermediate position. The level of schooling itself, however, is still only weakly decisive, except in the category of members of the teaching and intellectual professions, etc. The relation between level of studies and the way of life, even though it tends to assert itself, is not direct in every case. [182]

III

The group of relatives no longer coincides with the local unit. Neither the quarter, the sector, the block, nor in certain cases the "compound" are ethnically homogeneous any longer. In this case, what is the social role of the neighborhood? Under what conditions does it create relationships of a new type which are to be integrated into the new urban "pattern"? The groups of friends were formed essentially in the framework of the age class (3) as a consequence of the ethnic group (and often of the group of relatives in the broad sense). [563]

369x 621 571

3. See, for example, G. Balandier and P. Mercier, op. cit.

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/34 cont./

group of relatives in the broad sense). What is the influence of the neighborhood factor, among other new factors, on their constitution now? Such are the principal questions for which we shall give the first, very brief elements of an answer.

A. -- The neighborhood unit does not constitute a structured grouping, as in the village quarters. The decrease of mobility and of heterogeneity condition the creation of a common milieu of life, in the framework of the quarter as in that of the block. But, particularly in Médina, the quarters represent only an artificial segmentation and have no clearly /35/ marked centers (of commerce, of leisure, etc.). The weakness of the authority and prestige of the quarter heads is another aspect of this fact. As for the smaller elements, groups of blocks, blocks, compounds, their transformation into neighborhood communities based on a minimum of permanence of their components has advanced unevenly. The study of a certain number of blocks has permitted us to distinguish several types. In the first, almost all the people know one another (1), they often visit one another,

1. It is very easy there to find a person whose exact address is not known.

help one another, and on occasion have common leisure-time activities. In the opposite type, there is very little personal contact and mutual aid, and one hardly knows the names of the neighbors, even the immediate ones. An intermediate type is the one where the neighborhood relationships are reduced to very small circles, the relationships dispersed throughout the town, however, retaining more importance. It seems that this is the most frequent case. We shall briefly describe a block of this type.

It is often difficult to pick out from the complex network of relationships between the inhabitants of a block those which are based purely on neighborhood. In many cases, the fact of the neighborhood is eclipsed, as a factor of explanation, by

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/35 cont./

kinship, kinship by marriage, membership in the same ethnic group, the same religious persuasion, the same occupation; certain other facts are ambivalent, for example, membership in the same association. In the study that we have made of a certain number of blocks of Médina, we have tried to isolate the neighborhood factor at different levels of participation in common activities. We essentially retained: reciprocal visits, conversation groups, mutual aid (loans, etc.), relationships between women, the play groups of children. The relationships of simple politeness are not retained. We considered successively the relationships inside the compound -- when it is not inhabited by a single family -- and the relationships within the block. In the last case, a somewhat arbitrary limit is posed: the street is not a border, but a zone of assembly. It has not yet been possible to study completely the social role of the latter.

In the block that we shall take as an example, 12 out of 14 compounds were studied; the inhabitants of the other two compounds were on a trip or refused to lend themselves to the investigation. The block as a whole is very heterogeneous ethnically, but, however, with a clear dominance of Wolof-Lebou (2).

2. Six family heads who were manifestly Lebou persisted in calling themselves Wolof. Cf. above.

It contains 39 family groups (representing 199 persons) and 11 isolated bachelors, tenants of some of the preceding families. Five of these bachelors only live /36/ in Dakar seasonally, but in principle always in the same place. The distribution of the family heads by ethnic groups is as follows: 28 Wolof, 4 Lebou, 5 Toucouleur, 1 Sarakolé, 1 Socé. Among the isolated bachelors, one has: 5 Wolof, 2 Toucouleur, 2 Socé, 1 Bambara, 1 Soussou.

1. The study of the relationships within the compounds shows a certain variety of situations.[1] These compounds are

[1] [see chart, pp. 56-57.- Analyst]

/36 cont./

divided into several types by their composition: 369x 621 571●

-- Compounds composed of a single family group: extended kinship group based on the nephew-uterine uncle relationship (B), restricted family (E);

-- Compounds composed of restricted family groups, but having between them ties of distant collateral kinship (J);

--Compounds composed of restricted or extended family groups tied only by the ethnic relationship (A and N);

-- Compounds grouping restricted families from different ethnic groups (F, G);

-- Compounds grouping restricted families and isolated persons, all of the same ethnic group (L);

-- Compounds grouping restricted families and isolated persons, and ethnically varied (C, D, K, M).

The compounds of the first two types will not detain us; family solidarity plays a major role there. In the others, the situation is extremely variable. Frequent relationships exist everywhere on the level of the children (play groups), less frequently on the level of women, still less frequently on the level of men. Let us consider essentially the relationships which are not sustained by the ethnic community.

a) The bachelors, except when they are of the same ethnic group as some of the families of the compound (1 case, in compound D), participate little in the life of the compound; most eat outside and only spend the night at home. Mutual aid does little for them; most said that they had recourse, in case of sickness, to the aid of friends -- almost always of the same ethnic group -- on the outside. In one single case (compound K), the bachelors -- of the same ethnic group, moreover -- form a group eating together, going out together, etc.; the cooking is done for them by an old woman -- also of the same ethnic group -- a widow who lives with her children. [589]

b) Within the compound the ethnic disparity among the families does not exclude some minimal forms of mutual aid (loans of utensils, small purchases, care of children, etc.) [563]

/36 cont./
There is one single case of a ménage having practically no relations with the rest of the compound, that of a Sarakolé family (compound F). 369* 621 571● 563

/37/ c) The extreme cases of mutual aid, on the contrary, are only noticed among families that are related or at least of the same ethnic group. Thus, in the compounds I, N, D, one finds an unemployed man, married and father of a family, temporarily taken care of by his cousins (compound I) or by his neighbors who are related to him only in the broadest possible sense of the term (compounds D and N).

d) The play community of the children is encountered everywhere within the compounds, the ethnic differences not at all intervening. This and other elements, such as the life in the courtyards, the daily encounters at the water places, cause the women ultimately to have many more personal contacts than the men. The only case of a woman living relatively isolated is that of the Sarakolé woman already mentioned. [857]

2. The picture is a little different when one passes to the larger framework of the block. It is moreover divided longitudinally, the relations clearly being more frequent among the compounds which face on the same street. It is necessary, however, to add the shadings.

a) The play groups of the children are still larger, and neither the ethnic group nor other differential elements seem to play a role in their formation, but only proximity and individual affinities. [857]

b) As far as the women are concerned, the contacts that we noted above, conversations at the water place, etc., concern practically the whole block. On the other hand, visits and possible mutual aid occur almost exclusively among relatives, relatives by marriage, and women of the same ethnic group.

c) We have examined, for the men, the composition of groups of friends. In most cases, the majority of friends were dispersed throughout the town, these friends being either of the same ethnic group, of the same work group, or members of the same association -- these factors can all be combined, or [572]

/37 cont./

combined two by two. Out of 32 male heads of families, eight had no friends in the neighborhood (block and its immediate surroundings -- the relatives obviously being excluded). Among the 24 others, one counted 15 whose friends in the neighborhood were at the same time all members of the same ethnic group; for five others, they were either of the same ethnic group or members of the same syndicate;[1] for two others, they were either of the same ethnic group or members of the same religious association. Only the two heads of Lebou families, the ones settled in the block the longest and enjoying a certain prestige, had many friends in the neighborhood; the majority of the latter did not belong to the Lebou group and were not members of a like structured group. The factor of neighborhood, properly speaking, seemed, for our people as a whole, to account for only the most superficial type of relations. The common religious persuasion does not /38/ play an essential role; its limits rarely coincide with the limits of groups of friends. The religious associations, however, are practically the only ones which rest, in a certain number of cases, on a local basis. The importance of occupational ties (in the broad sense, including syndical activity) and, above all, that of ethnic ties are of primary importance.

B. -- In this domain, however, differences in behavior between the socio-occupational categories are seen to appear, and it is important to note them in order to complete the preceding data. One sees some distinctions delineated which, as a whole, go in the same direction as those encountered in the second part of this work. In our population investigated by questionnaires, one finds: 13% of those queried who have less than 10% of their connections belonging to the same ethnic group as themselves; 29% who have less than 30%; 57% who have less than 50%; 11% who have 100%. The following table indicates the distribution by socio-occupational categories:

[1] [i.e., trade union.--Analyst]

/38 cont./

Socio-occupational Category	Percentage of connections belonging to the same ethnic group			
	Less than 10%	Less than 30%	Less than 50%	100%
Farmers, fishermen	11%	26%	50%	7%
Laborers, domestics	7%	19%	41%	21%
Workers and artisans	13%	33%	64%	10%
Subordinate employees and functionaries	14%	33%	60%	11%
Superior employees and functionaries	17%	34%	61%	7%
Teaching, intellectual professions, etc.	26%	40%	72%	6%
Merchants, transporters, etc.,	6%	17%	41%	17%

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We thus find a first group where the role played by ethnic membership in the formation of the group of friends is more important than it is on the average: the laborers and domestics, the merchants and transporters. The opposite situation is found among the superior functionaries and employees and even more accentuated, among the members of the teaching and intellectual professions. The farmers are to be added to this group, however; most of them are Lebou, and these figures account well on the one hand for the loss of their particularism before the Wolof thrust, and on the other hand for the more /39/important role played among them by the factors of neighborhood. An average group is constituted by: the subordinate functionaries and employees, and, much more clearly than in the other domains considered, the workers and artisans.

Some remarks are necessary. The factor of ethnic regrouping retains its importance in all the categories, although unequally.

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/39 cont./ 369x 621 571 563

unequally. The scrutiny of the data concerning the neighborhood factor furnished by this same investigation is not finished; the first results seem to confirm those obtained in our monographic investigations: it in itself only plays a reduced role, only reinforcing the ties of some other origin. On the contrary, memberships in the same occupational milieu, in the same association, syndical, cultural, sportive, etc. (1), are important [572]

1. The study of the role of associations is reserved for another work.

factors in the formation of groups of friends. Finally, let us add that the average behaviors of ethnic groups are extremely variable. Their distribution, however, does not coincide exactly with the one that we have indicated in the domain of interethnic marriages. Only groups among whom the importance of the ethnic factor is clearly greater than the average, the Moors, the Peul, the Toucouleur, the Sarakolé; on the other hand it is slightly less among the Wolof and the Bambara, average among the Sérère, the Diola, the Soussou, the Cape Verdeans. The partial divergences between these two orders of data (2) pose in themselves a problem which will be the

2. Cf. II, E, 4.

subject of subsequent investigations.

We have studied essentially the permanent population of the town, moreover unequally stabilized. It remains to complete these data by the examination of the problems posed by the seasonal population, and, more generally, by the population without fixed residence. It is in this minority that one can really speak of facts of detribalization, in the sense of pure deterioration of the former social frameworks. On the contrary, we [182]

17: Mercier--49 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37
Dakar

/39 cont./
have seen that in the permanent population the kinship structures and ethnic membership (3) played a considerable

182
369*
[621]
[571]
[563]

> 3. It would also be necessary to examine the role played by the associations formed on an ethnic or regional basis.

role. Certainly, a new equilibrium has not been achieved everywhere, and we have noted that the kinship structures were not always adapted to the conditions of urban life. But one is far from dealing with an amorphous mass. Where one can speak /40/ of detribalization, among the elites of a new type, it is not in a purely negative sense. The crisis phase of traditional institutions has not completely passed. But the phase of reconstruction of institutions has begun; some average behavior which implies a certain equilibrium in new frameworks can already be disclosed. /Figs. 1-4 appear here./

17: Mercier--56 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37
Dakar

369
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
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17: Mercier--57 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37
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

Related by marriage

△	Wolof	W		Socé	So
○	Lebou	L		Soussou	S
□	Toucouleur	T		Bambara	B
	Sarakolé	Sa			

/see left side of Fig. 4/

Fig. 4.
/right side of Fig. 4/